

NEW AVENUES FOR MODELING JUDICIAL POLITICS

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Many of the ideas in Section MA derive from collaboration with Donald Songer and Jeffrey Segal, who might justly claim co-authorship. Both however should escape censure for the paper's many shortcomings - except Segal, whose patience, encouragement, and friendship over the years is materially responsible for the paper's existence. Like Dr. Frankenstein, he must assume some liability for his creations. I thank Ken Ward, Eric Reinhardt, David Epstein, and Susan Elmes for helpful suggestions.

Send comments to cmcl@columbia.edu; 212-222-0598 (fax); or 212-854-4302.




Figure 1. Infinitely repeated version of the standard game




Figure 2. Doctrine before Baxter




Figure 3. Lower court's doctrine-setting




Figure 4. Higher court's doctrine